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A War for the Soul of  America: A History of  the Culture Wars  by Andrew 
Hartman, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015. 
 
  Kicking off the season of year-end cultural assessments, Wesley Morris, in a recent 
edition of The New York Times Magazine, declared 2015 “The Year We Obsessed Over 
Identity.” Linking the creation of “alternate or auxiliary personae” to new technologies 
developed over the past decade, such as social media, Morris noted that our new identities 
“feel gleeful and liberating—and tied to an essentially American optimism.” The story 
recounts numerous instances of what I’ll call “identity bending” with regard to race, 
sexuality, and gender in popular culture, especially in movies, television, books, and music. 
Even academia gets a citation, when Morris recounts the “oddly compelling” Rachel 
Dolezal story (i.e. a white women who self-identifies as “black,” with “unwavering 
certainty”). Morris continued, observing that “our rigidly enforced racial lines are finally 
breaking down.”1  
 Wesley Morris does not pretend that this breakdown has resulted in some sort of 
choose-your-self post-racial utopia. Morris also doesn’t ignore the pushback, especially as 
heard in the rhetoric of emerging Republican presidential candidates (i.e. Donald Trump). 
But Morris doesn’t revise the historical timeline to anything much “more than a decade” 
for this identity bending. As is often typical when journalists recount the past leading up to 
their stories, the historical thinking is less expansive than might be hoped. Luckily we have 
Andrew Hartman’s excellent book, A War for the Soul of America, to demonstrate the limits 
of Morris’s historical thinking. Covering the post-World War II period, Hartman recounts 
a series of cultural and intellectual conflicts, in all their intensity, about identity and what 
it means to be an American.   
 
The Historiographic Context 
  Hartman’s book has been well-received, piling up positive reviews, in most corners 
of our shared intellectual history community because he took his story of the Culture Wars 
into the heart and soul of the American project. That project is constantly reexamining 
itself. Indeed, Hartman argues that debates, not certainties, about the soul of America are 
baked into the American project. Culture wars in general reflect the centrality of identity 
examination and refashioning. In a 2010 blog post that previewed his book, Hartman 
underscored the essential American characteristic of self-examination in an analysis of 
Allan Bloom’s “über text” of the Culture Wars, The Closing of the American Mind. Bloom 
had described his book as a “meditation on the state of our souls.” Hartman underscored 
the importance of the problem of “relativism” to Bloom, noting the latter’s theory about 
the idea of American culture as a “culture of becoming.”2  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 1 Wesley Morris, “The Year We Obsessed Over Identity,” The New York Times, October 6, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/11/magazine/the-year-we-obsessed-over-identity.html.  
 2 Andrew Hartman, “An Intellectual History of Culture as Becoming,” U.S. Intellectual History Blog, 
March 3, 2010, http://s-usih.org/2010/03/intellectual-history-of-culture-as.html; Andrew Hartman, A War 
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 Americans are a modern people in that they are constantly in movement and 
evolving. The potential to recreate one’s self is part of the American Dream. That said, 
Hartman argues that the extended, intense, and self-conscious questioning that occurred 
from the 1960s through the early 1990s constitutes a special episode in American history 
deserving of our attention and intense analysis. To understand whether the Culture Wars 
era was, on balance, positive or negative, one must discern the nature, or kind, of story it 
was.  
 Hartman’s provocative framing of the Culture Wars squares an objective synthesis 
of the characters and issues of the period. His objects of study are not unfamiliar to 
historians of the period, but Hartman’s narrative changes the direction of past scholarship. 
He most certainly moves the conversation away from religion as a primary source Culture 
Wars problems, as argued by James Davison Hunter. Daniel Rodgers’ 2011 book, Age of 
Fracture overlaid the Culture Wars period with the useful metaphor located in his book’s 
title. Rodgers argued that Americans, since the 1960s, voluntarily reduced their larger 
“circles of we” into “little platoons of society” through the rise of libertarian ideologies, 
decentralization, and renewed engagement with individualism. Hartman has stated that he 
believes Rodgers’ work downplayed politics and the real significance of cultural-political 
debates. Hartman also disagrees with those of us (myself, Dan Wickberg, Robert Genter, 
etc.) who see the Culture Wars of the Seventies, Eighties, and early Nineties as part of a 
longer continuum of modernity and reactions to it. To Hartman, earlier periods only 
consisted of elites and intellectuals confronting the “acids of modernity” such as relativism, 
subjectivism, Nietzsche’s nihilism, and secularism. The rest of the population was mostly 
sheltered from those problems. The 1960s, however, saw a revolution that universalized 
discussions of identity and fracture such that the term “culture wars” best describes the 
period from the 1960s to the early 1990s. The Sixties were, to Hartman, truly a “cultural 
watershed.”3  
 The watershed nature of that decade contrasted with the short-lived period during 
the late 1940s and 1950s where “powerful conservative norms” and “cultural standards” 
came together to enforce what Hartman calls “normative America.” That conformist 
paradigm “prized hard work, personal responsibility, individual merit, delayed gratification, 
social mobility, and other values that middle-class whites recognized as their own.” That 
framework also posited “stringent sexual expectations” and “strict gender roles.” The power 
ascribed by the author to this paradigm, at this point in history, is fundamental to 
understanding Hartman’s book in relation to the historiography. As he says, postwar 
normative America “was more omnipresent, and more coercive, than it had been before or 
has been since.”4 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
for the Soul of America: A History of the Culture Wars (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 2, 21, 
chapter 8 (pp. 222-252) 
 3 Andrew Hartman, “Age of Fracture v. Age of Culture Wars,” U.S. Intellectual History Blog, March 
11, 2015, http://s-usih.org/2015/03/age-of-fracture-v-age-of-culture-wars.html. 
 4 Hartman, A War for the Soul of America, 5. 
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  A War for the Soul of America makes perfect sense as a narrative of the Culture Wars 
with this strong assumption in mind. Hartman’s historicizing of that period sets up both 
his conservative critics and historian opponents. The former are undercut by Hartman’s 
acknowledgment that the 1950s held forth some “positive” characteristics amidst the weeds 
of several ‘isms’—racism, ethnocentrism, sexism, and conformism. The later historian 
critics, if they argue against his strong assumption, must confront masses of powerful 
historical scholarship on conformism of the 1950s.  
Praise and Affirmations 
 Hartman’s book offers numerous historical specifics in support of his larger 
arguments. I found his evidence compelling. Since those incidents and actors have been 
covered in many other reviews, I want to focus on larger problematic ideas and 
philosophical elements, indicated in Hartman’s book, that demonstrate the lasting value of 
his text. Those expansive topics show how Americans were, in his study, implicitly and 
explicitly critiquing the narrative of America. I found somewhere over twenty larger ideas 
and big questions during my first read, but will relay just ten here (followed by the page or 
chapter where I observed them in the text).  
 
1. Is society best organized around larger neutral principles friendly to individual 
aspirations, or around group solidarities in order to enable those group’s to overcome 
historical patterns of injustice? (p. 148) 
2. Is colorblindness a worthy aspiration for American society, or does it mask injustices? 
Put another way, what are the strengths of ‘meritocracy’ as an ideal when the starting places 
of citizens are so different? (chapter 4) 
3. The notion of a secular culture and the ‘secularization thesis’ animated a powerful 
cohort of religious-minded individuals during the Culture Wars (chapter three, esp. pp. 78-
79). Religious conservatives and paleoconservatives “railed against the state as an agent of 
secularism,” but also, paradoxically, allied with neoconservatives to reshape government to 
their liking (p. 215-16). What, then, is the role of government in American life for religious 
conservatives? 
4. What human traits are essential and/or biological, and which are constructed or 
contingent? What proportions of sameness and difference exist in the human species? 
These topics arise in discussions of race, gender, and sexuality (pp. 106-07, 139, 161). 
5. What ideas are abstract and universal? What things are particular and circumstantial? 
Does the particular precede the universal, or vice versa? What certainties exist in life? If 
things are uncertain and relative, are we not a set of beings defined by ‘becoming’ and 
change?  (pp. 21, 25, 155, 162, 232) 
6. Does culture shape society, or does culture follow social realities? What is the power of 
culture? (pp. 178, 199) 
7. The notions of standards, rigor, and excellence in education, at all levels, offered cover 
for institutional racism, sexism, and ethnocentrism (p. 233).  How is excellence to be 
assessed when cultural difference is the norm?  
3
Lacy: Review of "A War for the Soul of America: A History of the Cultur
Published by The Keep, 2015
	  	  
 4 
8. Do we embrace or deny modernity and the Enlightenment? Is the Enlightenment a 
place to rest intellectually or not? According to the scholars of race, colonialism, and 
gender, it is not (p. 232, 265). 
9. Revisionist complexity, which often relativized and historicized a unique past, was 
treated as a political obstacle to be destroyed by conservatives. Complexity was the enemy 
of national normative identity (pp. 279, 283). 
10. Just as narratives and our national story became objects of debate, the notion of a book 
or text itself became the object of discussion, courtesy of Stanley Fish. Should one pay 
more attention to the text itself, or its circumstances of production? If not the text, then 
theory matters more than the material item of the publication. And the author has less 
agency in the process of creation, and canons themselves became cultural constructions. 
All textual hierarchies were conventions of time, place, circumstance, and power (p. 225). 
   
 Hartman deserves a great deal of credit for intellectualizing and integrating such a 
diverse array of issues into his narrative. The complexity of Hartman’s text beckons us to 
think critically about what kind of story our nation is in. 
Critiques and Provocations 
 Given this praise, what might have been handled better in the book? What was left 
out? My answers to theses questions come from an attempt to look at Hartman’s book 
from the far left. Consider my responses more provocations than criticisms. 
 Given how “the market” ideal, when incorporated into government institutions, 
often results in unstable social outcomes, I wondered why neoliberalism and its 
relationship with neoconservatism—both oriented toward market-focused solutions to 
governmental and social problems—was absent from Hartman’s analysis. When identity is 
linked to economic benefits conferred by the government, surely government action or 
inaction might flare into debates about culture and identity. But in Hartman’s text no 
historical actors are labeled ‘neoliberal’, and no events are attributed to neoliberalism. I 
suspect Hartman’s reply to this might be that his historical actors didn’t use the term—i.e. 
that the term is a late twentieth-century creation that comes after his period of concern. 
And he does cover that term in his post-publication analysis of the differences between his 
own work and Rodgers’ Age of Fracture.5 But, for me anyway, that’s not enough. The advent 
of neoliberalism, so important to our own historical moment and so crucial to crucial to 
understanding some of the political and cultural political confusion of the present, needs 
to be addressed in our analyses post-1960s Culture Wars events. 
 My lament about the omission of neoliberalism led me to wonder about economic 
class and labor as categories of analysis in relation to the Culture Wars. Class is kind of 
everywhere and nowhere in the text. My concern about labor and the working classes goes 
to the extent of rejection of normative America. How did everyday people receive these 
changes? How did they respond to various Culture Wars events? A thorough history of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 5 Hartman, “Age of Fracture v. Age of Culture Wars.” 
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working and lower class reception of—and participation in—the Culture Wars would go 
some way toward dispelling pervasive myths about “the Silent Majority.” And this line of 
questioning is relevant since Hartman argues that earlier periods, that might be subsumed 
under the “culture wars” framework, were more about elites and intellectuals confronting 
problems with modernity. As much as it is possible in terms of evidence (i.e. oral histories, 
small-town paper pieces, letters), a bottom-up history of the Culture Wars would help us 
understand better its class dynamics.  
 Is there a way to address class, head on, without succumbing to its ability to 
overshadow all else? If relative economic equality enabled the power and strength of 
normative America, as Hartman states (p. 290), did a relative slide toward inequality—
which has been occurring since the 1970s alongside the growth of neoliberalism—enable 
more questioning, or a return to questioning, the ideals attributed to the soul of America? 
Does economic equality lessen questioning about that soul, or enable more philosophizing 
about it? Does economic or democratic socialism enable a stronger normative routine of 
life (and policing of normative values), or enable personal and social liberation, as the left 
argues? 
 Perhaps Hartman feared mixing the topics above into his cultural and intellectual 
elixir because of a strict desire to avoid Thomas Frank’s view of the Culture Wars as 
epiphenomenal, distracting readers from the “real” economic issues that matter, or ought 
to matter, to citizens and politicians? But does avoiding class analysis let Frank’s narrative, 
ironically, stand? Is there a way to integrate the excellent cultural and intellectual analysis 
offered by Hartman with Frank’s, such that the analyses are integrated rather than 
competing? I think Hartman’s conclusion about the power of capitalism (our “reigning 
American economic ideology”) to make “cultural revolution much likelier than social 
democracy” would make more sense if class had been dealt with more deliberately in the 
rest of the text (p. 290). 
 What of labor, work, and the soul of America? The idea of America is linked to our 
dreams and opportunities, which are, in part, about economic stability and the 
psychological benefits of steady work. Given that, how does one’s identity as a laborer 
factor into the Culture Wars? One must think with historians, such as Jefferson Cowie, 
about the dislocation of workers and decline of the American Dream in the 1970s and 
1980s, during the prime years of the Culture Wars. As Joshua Zeitz recently pithily stated 
it: “The ‘70s were a punishing time for America’s working-class communities.”6 One way 
into this topic is music.  
 Hartman does not neglect music, but one could use it more to think about labor 
and capitalism. What kinds of stories were told in the music of the laboring or lower 
middle classes? How did the key of those classes register in terms of the tone, volume, and 
rhythm of wars over culture? If Bruce Springsteen wrote a song about the Culture Wars, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 6 Jefferson Cowie, Stayin’ Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of the Working Class (New York: The New 
Press, 2010); Joshua Zeitz, “Born to Run and the Decline of the American Dream,” The Atlantic, August 24, 
2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2015/08/born-to-run-at-40/402137/. 
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what would it sound like? Surely those born the U.S.A., in the 1960s and 1970s, were 
running from the American Dream turned nightmare. What were the Culture Wars of the 
Rust Belt?  Surely Billy Joel’s “Allentown,” or “Outlaw” country music, say something 
about the decline of laboring identities during the Culture Wars. Did the laboring blues of 
rock, country, metal, and rap attenuate or exacerbate Culture Wars events? 
 Cowie provides some evidence that might’ve inspired Hartman, or been the basis 
for further analysis of working-class reactions to the Culture Wars in Hartman’s book. 
Chapter four of Stayin’ Alive helps underscores the “class wars of the 1970s”—i.e. how the 
battles of labor became points of concern in cultural politics, especially in country music 
and the expansion of popular affection for that musical genre as it represented, seemingly, 
the common person. Cowie’s text, overall, points toward the slow, painful decline of the 
identity of “worker,” in the late 1960s and through the 1970s, and suggests (implicitly) that 
the decline may have fed the Culture Wars battles of the 1980s. When “working-class” 
became reduced to “industrial workers,” due the inability of union leadership to change 
with the times, the possibility of “a more expansive notion of working-class identity” was 
eclipsed. One result, Cowie argues, was that “a republic of anxiety overtook a republic of 
security” in the 1970s.7  
 If certain popular dissatisfactions of the working-class could no longer be expressed 
through union actions or strikes, perhaps those frustrations resurfaced in debates about 
other identities, especially when racial and ethnic identities became the locus of some 
social, economic, and political benefits? The devaluation of the working class occurred as 
other identity formations increased in value. I do not mean to suggest that an integration 
of working classes into the events of Hartman’s narrative necessarily involves a mass social-
psychological theory (i.e. sublimation, return of the repressed, etc.). But perhaps a more 
granular exploration of working and lower-class participation in Culture Wars battles 
might provide a more thorough view of the range and limits of “identity” in the era—about 
the topics for which citizens might engage in cultural battles.  
Conclusion 
 Despite these critiques and provocations, which really point toward future scholarly 
efforts, Hartman’s book is now, in my judgment, a leading text in the canon of historical 
studies of the Culture Wars. Future books will have to go through Hartman, just as he has 
addressed Hunter and Rodgers in his work. My own questions could not have arisen if A 
War for the Soul of America hadn’t forced me to rethink my own perspective on Culture 
Wars events—a perspective strongly colored by my prior work on the topic through the lens 
of the great books idea and literary canons. In the morass of debates about book lists, 
canonical authors, syllabi, and publishing projects, I sometimes lost track of other arenas 
and the larger implications of those battles. Courtesy of Hartman’s book, none of us will 
forget that the Culture Wars get at Hector St. John de Crevecouer’s still relevant question: 
“What then is the American, this new man?”8 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 7 Cowie, 10, chapter four passim, 362, 368.  
 8 A quote Hartman uses on p. 2 of his text.   
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 And, as Wesley Morris identified this fall, questions about identity have been 
especially relevant in 2015. Morris argues that “the yearning to transcend race keeps 
coming up against the bedrock cultural matter of separateness.” Extending the metaphor 
further, in a way that shows the continued relevance of older Culture Wars, Morris notes 
“the tectonic plates of the culture [of separateness] keep pushing against one another with 
greater, earthquaking force.” Whether or not one has more agency in choosing an identity, 
one still cannot control the perceptions and consequences of those choices in society at 
large, especially in relation to vocal, reactionary minorities. As Morris notes, “I live with 
two identities: mine and others’ perceptions of it.” 9Battles over identity may ebb and flow 
in American history, but the current iteration has revisited the intensity of historical 
episodes covered in Hartman’s book. Whether or not one agrees with his narrative or 
periodization, it’s hard to argue that an exploration of the Culture Wars is irrelevant today. 
Indeed, A War for the Soul of America happens to be a most excellent meditation on the 
topic. 
 
Tim Lacy, Northwestern University 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 9 Morris, “Identity.” 
7
Lacy: Review of "A War for the Soul of America: A History of the Cultur
Published by The Keep, 2015
